Members of the Shembe Church on the Canaan Holy Mountain at Ndwedwe, near Durban, South Africa. Rajesh Jantilal/AFP Members of the Shembe Church on the Canaan Holy Mountain at Ndwedwe, near Durban, South Africa. Rajesh Jantilal/AFP
Image: Rajesh Jantilal/AFP
In most of the world, countries with religious populations are more likely to have governments that support religion through laws and policies. These laws might include religious education, funding for religious institutions, and laws based on religious values. Not so in sub-Saharan Africa.
In a recently published research paper, David Jeffery-Schwikkard, who studies secularism, argues that sub-Saharan African countries provide little state support for religion, even though their populations are among the most devout globally.
These findings unsettle many common misconceptions about the role of religion in politics. The Conversation Africa asked him a few questions.
A population is normally considered very religious if most people say religion is “very important” in their lives or report attending religious services at least once a week.
In surveys conducted between 2007 and 2018 by the Pew Research Centre, 46% of respondents outside sub-Saharan Africa said religion was very important in their lives. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the average is nearly twice that: 89%. Ethiopia and Senegal are among the most religious countries in the world. In both cases, 98% of people said religion was very important. Of the 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for which Pew has data, Botswana (71%) and South Africa (75%) are the least religious. Yet even these countries are far above the global average.
Generally, countries with religious populations have states that provide a lot of support to religion. This is what you would expect, since religious citizens probably want more state support for their religions.
What this means, though, is that commentators often assume that religious citizens are a threat to secular states. This then shapes how analysts make sense of public displays of religion. One example of this is in South Africa, where many people assumed that former president Jacob Zuma, who often used religious rhetoric, would pursue religious laws and policies.
These assumptions are especially common in analyses of religion and politics in Africa. Yet, while it is easy to identify laws or policies in sub-Saharan Africa that are religious, one can easily overlook the fact that having some of these laws is not unusual globally. In other words, having some pro-religion laws and policies doesn’t necessarily mean that countries are governed by religious beliefs.
Thus one might focus on Ghana’s support for Hajj, while forgetting that the UK reserves seats in the House of Lords for the Church of England, and that Germany collects taxes on behalf of churches. Yet the UK and Germany are rarely seen as religious states. Some level of state support for religion does not mean that a country is governed by religious beliefs.
Contrary to the global trend, countries in sub-Saharan Africa provide very little state support to religion – less than half the global average. This is as measured by the Religion and State Project at Bar Ilan University, based on the number of different types of support provided, such as reserving political positions for religious leaders or funding religious schools.
One of the most popular explanations for the scant support for religion is that states in sub-Saharan Africa lack the necessary financial and administrative capacity. These states, the argument goes, would provide more support if only they had more money and were better able to implement their policies.
However, data from the World Bank shows that this is not the case: overall, there is no relationship between state capacity and support for religion.
A more plausible explanation is that religious actors in these countries tend to lack moral authority. Moral authority, as theorised by American political scientist Anna Grzymala-Busse, is the extent to which people see religious actors as defenders of the nation.
Several factors are conducive to moral authority. These include whether people share the same ethnicity or religion, whether religious actors have control over education, and whether they have sided with the “right side” in moments of national crisis.
Consider Rwanda and Mozambique.
Until 1994, the Roman Catholic Church in Rwanda enjoyed moral prestige. The church controlled a significant share of the education system and had supported the independence movement against Belgium. Most Rwandans were Catholic. And indeed, the church maintained a very close relationship with the state after independence in 1962.
Yet this moral authority was forfeited after the church was seen to be complicit in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, which claimed about 800,000 lives. Today, the government keeps a careful distance from religion, despite 90% of Rwandans reporting that religion is very important in their lives.
Mozambique provides a contrast to Rwanda, yet with similar outcomes. The Roman Catholic Church denounced the liberation movement’s struggle against Portugal. The country has no religious or ethnic majority. At independence, formal education was scarce.
There was therefore little reason for Mozambicans to see the church as a defender of the nation. On the contrary, religious institutions were persecuted after independence. Like Rwanda, Mozambique provides extremely little state support for religion, despite being one of the most religious countries internationally.
These factors – religious diversity, limited enrolment in schools controlled by religious organisations, and moments of political crisis in which those organisations can misstep – make it less likely that religious actors are held by citizens as integral to national identity. And while sub-Saharan Africa is extremely varied, common historical influences, such as the legacies of colonialism, may make these factors more likely.
Clearly, we need to be more careful in how we interpret the role of religion in politics. While it might be tempting to see religious fervour as a threat to secular democracy, it is not necessarily so. A politician might use religious rhetoric, but this does not mean that it will translate into religious laws. Equally, some state support for religion is not unusual globally. Analyses of single policies need to keep this in mind.
This research also upends the way many people normally think about secularism. Many people in Europe have become less religious. Consequently, European states are offered as models of secularism. However, this has it backwards.
Despite their electorates being less religious, European states are more involved in religion than their counterparts in sub-Saharan African. If secularism is the separation of religion and the state, then countries in sub-Saharan Africa – which maintain a secular state despite widespread religion – are in fact the exemplar. | The Conversation
David Jeffery-Schwikkard is a PhD Candidate (Theology and Religious Studies) at King's College London